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Chapter One: 
 
A New Context for the Absurd 
 
 When literary critics speak of the absurd, they frequently do so in the context of 
those writers who developed and popularized the concept; the origins of the concept are 
European and are often traced back to Soren Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death, 
published in 1849.  Almost a century later, Albert Camus popularized the idea in The Myth of 
Sisyphus, though his is a largely secularized modification of Kierkegaard’s original 
formulation.  Published in 1942, Sisyphus is often described as the most significant modern 
text concerning the absurd.  Early in the text, Camus typifies the absurd in its most basic 
form: 
 What, then, is that incalculable feeling that deprives the mind of the sleep necessary 
to life?  A world that can be explained even with bad reasons is a familiar world.  
But, on the other hand, in a universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights, man 
feels an alien, a stranger.  His exile is without remedy since he is deprived of the 
memory of a lost home or the hope of a promised land.  This divorce between man 
and his life, the actor and the setting, is properly the feeling of absurdity (Camus 6). 
In the wake of occasionally nihilistic early 20th century existential philosophy, Camus 
attempted to crystallize the notion of humanity’s struggle for meaning in the context of world 
wars, genocide and rapidly advancing but potentially dehumanizing technology and industry.  
Like many other existentialists before him, Camus concludes that while there is no essential 
“meaning” in life, the struggle to create that meaning is essential to survival and to an 
actualized life.  Camus’ concept of the absurd is ultimately a positive one, at least when 
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compared to other philosophers: in the preface, he writes that The Myth of Sisyphus is, “amid 
the French and European disaster [a declaration] that even within the limits of nihilism it is 
possible to find the means to proceed beyond nihilism” and that it should serve as a “lucid 
invitation to live and to create, in the very midst of the desert” (preface v).  Thus, for Camus, 
the absurd, “hitherto taken as a conclusion, is considered in [Sisyphus] a starting point” (2). 
Amid the widespread tensions about the future of humanity in the 20
th
 century, the 
sudden popularity in literary scholarship focused on the absurd should come as little surprise.  
It is necessary, however, to differentiate between “absurdist” readings and literary criticism 
which contemplates the absurd in the specific context as laid out by Camus.  The word 
“absurd” enjoys a wide range of usage, but in popular terms, it is typically employed to 
signify something meaningless or inscrutable.  This is a somewhat reductive notion of the 
absurd and has little to do with the sort of existentialist psychology expounded by Camus.  
Thus, in this thesis I have attempted to make connections between notions of the absurd as an 
existential concept, using Camus as a framework, and its representations in the major works 
of William Faulkner, a writer often described in passing as one who incorporates elements of 
the absurd into his texts.  For example, John K. Simon, writing at the end of a decade-long 
critical explosion in response to William Faulkner’s 1949 Nobel Prize acceptance speech, 
asserts that when Faulkner wrote The Sound and the Fury, he initiated “a certain 
tendency…in the modern novel to create, out of pure experience and seemingly inhuman 
observation, the juxtaposition of absolute and relative which represents the closed universe of 
absurdity” (111).  This sense of the juxtaposition of absolute and relative is particularly 
relevant in the major works of Faulkner, which are well-known in part for Faulkner’s nearly 
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frenetic representations of hyper-subjectivity.  That being said, he is not the only modernist 
writer who attempted to represent the subjective in ways hitherto unseen:  notable masters 
like Woolf and Joyce, among others, experimented with this new form before Faulkner, and 
with, as many would argue, greater success.  However, the works discussed in this thesis lend 
themselves to interpretation within the absurd context not solely because of their form, but 
because they contain thematic elements which run parallel with the absurd as articulated by 
Camus.  The philosopher spoke often of Faulkner, and, aside from Melville, is “the 
only…American novelist to be singled out by Camus for consistent praise” (Couch 122).  
Camus adapted Faulkner’s Requiem for a Nun for the French stage, but oddly he never wrote 
about The Sound and the Fury, or Absalom, Absalom!—he did, however, briefly write about 
As I Lay Dying in the context of tragedy (Kennedy 125).   
Offered for consideration here is the suggestion that Faulkner’s tendency toward 
heightened subjectivity in As I Lay Dying and The Sound and the Fury/Absalom, Absalom! 
(whose pairing is justified due to shared characters and themes) not only calls attention to the 
underlying absurdity of the circumstances found in each novel, but reveals the difficulties of 
manufacturing a stable identity and creating an assured mental space in the world, the latter 
of which forms the cornerstone of Camus’ absurd.  The fragmented plots/structures of these 
texts, aside from being merely innovative, become necessary to convey the intense 
psychological unrest experienced by characters as they suffer through these crises of identity 
and sense of time/place.  Faulkner’s novelistic forms, through their repeated contrasting of 
the relative and absolute, then work toward creating representations of the absurd not unlike 
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those articulated by Camus and others.  Admittedly, however, his characters rarely transcend 
their crippling outlooks on life; for them, the absurd is the conclusion, not a starting point. 
The first of the three texts that will be examined is As I Lay Dying, which emphasizes 
the breakdown of familial stability as conveyed through most members of the Bundren 
family.  Elements of the absurd find currency in Faulkner’s perpetually skewed descriptions 
of the family, but more importantly in how the family itself conceives of “family.”  Of 
course, these conceptions vary from person to person, but most have perverse senses of 
obligation and responsibility to the rest of their family. For many of the Bundrens, any 
interaction with another family member is predicated upon crises of individual identity, 
which are paradoxically linked to one’s self-identifying role in the family.  The intensity of 
this paradox varies from one character to another, but when tallied together, forms a mosaic 
of dysfunction, though one often backgrounded by the structure/ostensible plot of the novel. 
The disjunction between the expected literary “journey,” and the various responses to and 
interpretations of that journey is the key to Faulkner’s representation of the absurd in As I 
Lay Dying.  Many of the characters, through a variety of circumstances ranging from greed, 
to infidelity, to mental derangement, to simple youthful naïveté, experience what Camus 
describes as “exile without remedy,” as they are, in numerous ways, “deprived of the…hope 
of a promised land” (Camus 6).  This is manifest in the novel’s physical journey to bury 
Addie Bundren as per her request: the family’s “promised land” is a gravesite, and each feel 
compelled to get there for reasons that might be considered absurd; certainly the 
circumstances of the journey and how each character deals with them are absurd.  For 
example, Darl represents, as do many of Faulkner’s significant characters, the ratiocinative 
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would-be intellectual left with no choice but to wallow in dire and increasingly outrageous 
circumstances.  This sort of Faulknerian character, according to Joseph R. Urgo, tends to 
suffer through a conflict that is largely intellectual and epistemological (11).  In Darl’s case, 
meaning is produced through an interior drama that revolves around that very search for 
meaning (11).  And, as with other Faulkner characters, we are witness to Darl’s gradual 
breakdown as he searches for that meaning, even as he remains the text’s most objective and 
persistent narrator.  As one critic has noted, his gradual “breakdown as an individual does not 
invalidate his point of view of the Bundren family and their journey” (Simon 106).  In fact, 
by the time Darl slips into a kind of insanity by the novel’s end, Simon postulates that Darl’s 
instinct is still to remain with his family, this despite the clearly negative impact they’ve had 
on him.  Simon writes, “[O]n the contrary, it is Darl's personal dissolution, his ability to 
embody fully the absurd perspective of objectification [which] provides, in the midst of his 
apparently confused pattern of thought and hysteria, the clear, straight-faced image of the 
Bundren family” (106).  This heightened awareness, working somehow in concert with an 
ever-decreasing grasp on his own sense of self, renders Darl a distinctly different person than 
his other family members, yet one still inextricably linked to and affected by them.  At one 
point, Darl attempts to make sense of this dynamic, saying: “I don't know what I am. I don't 
know if I am or not. Jewel knows he is, because he does not know that he does not know 
whether he is or not” (102).  Darl’s statement is indicative of the complicated link between 
family and self-identity, while also revealing the relativity of one’s identity.  Though other 
family members do not possess Darl's absurd perception, major features of their individual 
identities are, like Darl’s, formed in relation to the rest of their family.  Like Darl, interpreting 
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those characters in this context reveals similarly confused states of self-identification.  In any 
case, the underlying purpose for the family’s journey dictates that once their destination is 
reached, the travelers should simply turn around and return home.  Structurally, then, As I 
Lay Dying revels in its absurdist dismantling of the archetypal personal journey toward 
growth. 
 Like As I Lay Dying, The Sound and the Fury and Absalom, Absalom! contain 
characters who, according to Donald Kartiganer, “are not so much single, separate persons as 
collective enterprises, the products and processes of family dramas apart from which the 
individual actor is scarcely intelligible” (381).  This should not direct one’s attention solely to 
the functions (or dysfunctions) of the family, but instead highlight the process through which 
Faulkner’s characters are forced to conceive of their own identities and places in the world.  
In these particular novels the absurd is represented through both characterization and the 
highly fragmented narrative structures in ways not unlike As I Lay Dying, but here Faulkner 
expands his scope significantly.  Rather than focusing on a single journey and the 
interpretations of that journey, each of the novels features as its central plot the process of 
making sense out of the past and the impact of the past on the present.  Perhaps this is an 
inherently absurd endeavor; at the very least, it poses danger.  In his introduction to William 
Carlos Williams’ In The American Grain, critic and poet Horace Gregory asserts that, “The 
desire to know history is a near relative of the desire to know truth, and that is where, for 
most of us, a pit lies waiting” (Williams ix).  Some of Faulkner’s most memorable characters 
fall into that very pit, and unlike Camus’ Sisyphus, are unable to persist. 
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 Quentin Compson, a major character in these two novels, embodies this struggle.  
Unlike Camus’ Sisyphus, who chooses to persist in a state of unending toil, Quentin of 
course commits suicide, which pushes his character into the grey area between absurdity and 
nihilism.  The Sound and the Fury is particularly well-suited to being interpreted in this 
context, though the text contains at least two other characters worthy of examination:  Benjy 
and Jason IV, both brothers of Quentin.  Faulkner reinforces the futility of both Benjy and 
Jason IV’s situations in ways which are similar to Quentin's struggle.  Because the absurd is 
essentially the result of one's subjective outlook on the world, both of these characters, and 
Quentin, are interpreted with an interest in what constitutes their subjective responses to the 
world.  Without fail, we see their responses predicated on unavoidable and uncontrollable 
circumstances, much to the detriment of their individual spirits and well-beings.  
 If we can accept as true Abel’s claim statement that “Almost all members of the 
Compson household are severely influenced by the meaninglessness of their lives or by the 
desire to overcome the nothingness that surrounds them” (37), then Absalom, Absalom! may 
be read as an intensely detailed account of the process of attempting to overcome that 
meaninglessness, and the ultimate failure to do so.  The dominant impression one takes from 
Quentin and Shreve’s conversations in the text is the impossibility of constructing history out 
of fragments of the past.  The intensity of this task is linked to one’s own fascination with 
history; in this text, Shreve is an almost passive observer, as he has little to gain, whereas 
Quentin approaches the endeavor with what appears to be a life-or-death level of intensity.  
As we eventually see, Quentin’s struggle to recover some lost part of himself becomes 
increasingly absurd when taking into account the ambiguity not only of the past, but of what 
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the past can possibly mean in the present.  As both philosophy of history and family drama, 
Absalom, Absalom! has as its foundation uniquely American concerns over a bloody past 
spilling into the present.  While the reconstruction of Thomas Sutpen’s history responds to 
the subjective impulses of Quentin and Shreve, the likely “facts” of his history are distinctly 
American: an individual carving out his own space in a new, unclaimed land, indifferent to 
notions of conventional morality but inclined toward ambition and material accretion.  Along 
with The Sound and the Fury, Absalom, Absalom! is more directly concerned with what may 
be considered traditional societal concerns (race and gender, for example), when compared to 
As I Lay Dying, but like Bundrens’ story, it ultimately returns to focus on family members’ 
interpretations of one another and of their own lives.  In Quentin’s case, this familial dynamic 
has a paralyzing effect on his conception of the future.  Sutpen, Caddy, and Jason Compson 
are the primary deconstructing forces on Quentin, as each creates a world-view which has no 
allowance for clarity or unobstructed meaning; or at least positive meaning.   
 Finally, I’d like to say a brief word about the ramifications of such interpretations of 
Faulkner.  First, one may ask: does Faulkner share this view of humanity?  Are his characters 
simply a nihilistic outlet or something more?  Are these texts absurd for absurdity’s sake?  As 
his popularity grew mid-century, critics often cast Faulkner as an excessively dark writer and 
insinuated he was a reactionary product of his time.  In the essay, “America’s Conservative 
Revolution,” published shortly after Faulkner’s acclaim grew in the 1950s, writer Chadwick 
Hall observes in American society “the shift from a belief that man is inherently good to the 
idea that man is ‘capable of every insanity and atrocity’” (213).  He attributes this shift to 
World War II, and one example of its artistic manifestation is what he calls “the popularity of 
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the violence-fiction of William Faulkner” (213).  Hall is arguing in support of the New Deal, 
which leads him to connect the writings of Faulkner to American public policy.  He writes: 
“The idea that man is bad is...a traditional justification of the principle of stability and status 
quo” (213).  In other words, for Hall there exists a real danger in how people are represented, 
even artistically.  Hopefully, the following readings of Faulkner’s most lauded and dark texts, 
in the context of Camus’ absurd, will preclude any simple moral judgment and should reveal 
the complexity with which Faulkner represents his characters: there is certainly violence, and 
there are bad people, but ultimately their concerns belong to all of us, regardless of ideology. 
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Chapter Two: 
‘Something to Laugh at’:  As I Lay Dying’s Absurdist Family Quest 
 Compared to most of Faulkner’s early novels, As I Lay Dying initially attracted 
little critical attention or acclaim.  Some of the earliest reviews were in fact quite damning, 
not due to a lack of technical effort of Faulkner’s behalf, but because some felt the material 
fell short of the standard he created for himself.  An anonymous reviewer for the New York 
Times wrote, “One comes away from As I Lay Dying with a commingled sense of respect for 
the author and an intense annoyance—emotional rather than intellectual—with him for 
spending his rich inventive faculty on such a witch’s brew of a family” ([Review] 6).  
Similarly, after sustained criticism of the novel which included labeling it “nonsense,” a 
reviewer for The Observer conceded, “It is only fair to add that there are dimly discernible in 
this book the makings of something worth writing; if it were not so…one would not waste 
time in criticizing Mr. Faulkner” (Gould 6).  The reviews indicate that from its initial 
publication it has not been uncommon for readers to dismiss the tale of the Bundrens as 
trivial.  Admittedly, unlike the novels which will be discussed in the next section, the 
structure of As I Lay Dying is remarkably simple: the story of the Bundrens’ journey to bury 
Addie, the family matriarch, constitutes most of the text and is told in chronological order 
with few deviations.  Despite this superficial simplicity, Slaughter notes that criticism of the 
text “manifests the heterogeneity, the ambivalence, and the outright contradiction that 
characterize Faulkner criticism in general” (16).  She points to the divide between 
“traditional” readings of the text which attempt to find stated meaning and those readings 
which take up issues of “time and space…memory and imagination [and] consciousness and 
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unconciousness” (16).  The consistent complicating factor in the text, regardless of the 
critical framework employed, is the novel’s large cast of narrators, over a dozen, who 
typically narrate a single chapter before Faulkner shifts his focus.  Major characters include 
Addie and Anse Bundren, the mother and father respectively, and their offspring, from eldest 
to youngest: Cash, Darl, Dewey Dell (the only daughter), and Vardaman.  The other child is 
Jewel, approximately twenty years of age, who was conceived between Addie and a local 
reverend; Darl and Addie are the only family members aware of this fact.  The voice of each 
character differs dramatically from the others, but all perspectives focus on the journey at 
hand.  Faulkner famously claims to have written the book straight through in six weeks 
without changing a word, which may account for its relative concision.   
 Despite its narrative simplicity, critics are often confounded when trying to create a 
cohesive reading of the text.  In his book-length Faulkner study, Quest for Failure, Walter J. 
Slatoff summarizes one of the central issues with interpreting As I Lay Dying: “One is 
uncertain about the qualities of some of the important characters and about how to feel 
toward them; one is puzzled by the meanings of many of the events…and above all one is 
uncertain to what extent one has been watching an epic or tragedy or farce” (159).  This 
confusion can be attributed to those constantly shifting viewpoints, which, rather than 
lending consistency to the narrative, create a panorama of subjectivities which contradict, 
confuse, or even ignore one another.  Determining which speaker represents the central 
viewpoint thus becomes quite difficult, which in turn renders the journey and its underlying 
significance constantly filtered through different individuals. 
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   The struggle to make sense of the journey has yielded impressive and varied critical 
responses, as mentioned above.  However, none has attempted to interpret the novel’s 
characters on their journey using the framework of the absurd articulated by Camus.  Some 
critics have commented on the structure of the text and argued that its construction is integral 
to the implied overall meaning, though such studies often emphasize the text's farcical or 
tragic qualities.  Those elements are related to absurdity, but, again, not in the context as 
articulated by Camus (interpretations which emphasize the text's comedic elements will be 
given consideration later in this chapter).  Nonetheless, these readings do support, at the very 
least, the idea of the text’s structural integrity, as opposed to those critics who argue, as initial 
reviewers did, that there is no meaning.  I hope to demonstrate that an interpretation of the 
text through the framework of the absurd is predicated upon the text’s inherent structural and 
thematic coherence. 
 Establishing a structural framework for the text is a necessity for this interpretation, 
and a particularly relevant essay toward this end is Elizabeth Kerr’s “As I Lay Dying as Ironic 
Quest,” which uses as critical framework an inverted version of the quest romance 
(elucidated by Northrop Frye in his Anatomy of Criticism and frequently cited by Kerr).  
Since its publication in 1962, her essay has been frequently cited in criticism of the novel for 
its unified interpretation of the family’s journey.  Kerr’s structural analysis emphasizes the 
conceptual antithesis of As I Lay Dying in relation to the standard aspects of the quest 
romance: the initial urge for wish-fulfillment, the idyllic settings, the archetypal characters 
who range from the sleeping beauty, to the enchanted knight, the sorcerer’s apprentice, etc., 
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and of course the final dramatic resolution of the quest (9-10).  Aspects of Kerr’s reading are 
tenuous, particularly her readings of minor characters who, despite their role in Faulkner’s 
supposedly inverted quest romance, fit into the cadre of characters found throughout 
Faulkner’s canon.  Kerr’s essay also understates the significance of the reason for the “quest” 
in As I Lay Dying, as well as who partakes in it, instead focusing on the parallels that do exist 
related solely to form.  Her vital point is that the “consistency of the inversion would seem 
incompatible with any sentimental or heroic concept: is it rather the essence of ironic 
mockery” (Kerr 17).  More than just a mockery of form, the text uses the familiar structure to 
mock the familial relations that underpin the very reason for the journey.  Critics of the novel 
who insist on its meaninglessness overlook or ignore this aspect of the text and in turn are 
unable to appreciate the novel’s ultimately absurd plot arc.  The “meaninglessness” of As I 
Lay Dying is nearly meta-, in that the reader is invited into the text to witness the relations 
between family members and see how each one is, in various ways, irrevocably isolated from 
the other.  The characters are, despite their alienation from one another, members of the same 
immediate family, and each embarks on the same ostensible quest to bury Addie.  The close 
proximity to one another on the journey seems to bring out latent problems within the family.  
The burial of the matriarch is not just an inversion of the quest romance plot structure, but the 
decaying body itself “serves as a metaphor for the family’s unspoken histories that have been 
pushed aside but stubbornly refuse burial” (Baldanzi & Schlabach 38).  The stubborn refusal 
is manifest in various family members’ insistence on forward progress.  They seem to be 
compelled on their quest as its presupposed form dictates, rather than by some rational 
purpose; they must push on because they must arrive at a conclusion.   
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 In the context of Camus’ absurd, the very nature of the Bundrens’ journey 
(including how members of the family relate to one another while on it) violates what Camus 
believes is the key to living in good faith: One should “recognize the struggle, [must] not 
absolutely scorn reason, and [admit] the irrational” (37).  Camus’ dictum implies that, those 
who to do these things will necessarily make an undesirable “leap before knowing”—which, 
for Camus, essentially means putting one’s will into something that appeases and soothes 
even as it creates an outlook based on self-deception.  That sort of bad faith comes to typify 
the Bundrens and their journey.  While despicable characters may account for negative 
critical opinions of the novel, they should not cause one to dismiss the work as a whole.  For 
while most of the characters may suffer from a lack of meaningful relationships or purpose, 
that very absence forms the backbone of the novel’s meaning.   
 The novel begins with the passing of the family matriarch: Addie has been dead for 
nearly three days by the time the family starts out, and not long after, her corpse is mangled 
by nails driven through the coffin by Vardaman, her youngest son.  Anse, the family’s 
impotent and pitiable patriarch, refuses his neighbor’s offer to spend the night and wait out a 
flood before crossing a river, and as a result her coffin is nearly swept away in the current.  
These circumstances would indicate that the family must be compelled for greater reasons 
than satisfying the wishes of the deceased Addie, reasons which are gradually revealed on the 
journey.  Much may be said about the motivations of each family member (which range from 
seeking an abortion, to procuring new teeth, or simply being brought along for the journey), 
but the character who grants us the most insight into the family as unit is Darl Bundren.  
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Because he is the narrator of nearly one-third of the text, the workings of his mind are 
frequently on display and form the only consistent narrative voice in the text.  In a novel of 
intense subjectivity, Darl is also perhaps the most objective, and he uses his powers of 
observation and intuition to convey information to the reader of which family members are 
not aware or choose to ignore.   
 Unfortunately for Darl, his ratiocinative tendencies produce no positive outcomes.  
He recognizes a struggle that his family members, in their various stages of self-involvement, 
are unable to see.  Despite his desires for resolution, he often simply confounds himself 
further, and reaches various stages of crippling indecision and self-doubt.  Out of every 
problem, Darl sees his own unending Sisyphean struggle.  Most of the family members 
provide fodder for Darl’s anxiety, but two specific interactions with Dewey Dell and Jewel 
illustrate both his awareness of the journey’s underlying absurdity, and his convoluted state-
of-mind, which makes coming to terms with the situation impossible.  
 As the journey progresses, it becomes clear that Darl’s struggle has less to do with 
the way he is treated by other family members than his own preoccupations with their 
motivations and thoughts.  Though the instances are many, two in particular exemplify the 
struggle he has with the disjunct between his own highly ratiocinative mind and the 
intractablility of his various family members.  They of course have their own reasons for 
their actions, but good or bad, Darl sees motives as an impediment to his own understanding 
of his family.  The Bundrens do have their share of secrets and conceits, and these cause Darl 
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an increasing amount of agony, rendering what would be a meaningful journey into a rote 
and hollow burial ritual.   
 Dewey Dell, Darl's sister, is certainly one of the least despicable Bundrens.  She 
narrates only a handful of chapters, enough to reveal her own secret motivation for the 
journey: that she seeks an abortion from any willing doctor.  Even before her mother dies, 
Dewey Dell is confronted by Darl, who seeks an explanation for her odd behavior.  Her 
refusal to answer pushes Darl to anger, even before the family has started their catastrophic 
journey: “‘You want her to die so you can get to town: is that it?’ She wouldn’t say what we 
both knew. ‘The reason you will not say it is, when you say it, even to yourself, you know it 
is true: is that it? But you know it is true now.  I can almost tell you the day when you knew it 
is true.  Why won’t you say it, even to yourself?’” (274).  Darl’s frustration here reveals a 
sort of layered thinking that comes to define his growing mania.  At this specific moment, he 
is aware of the falsity of Dewey Dell’s projected self; in this case her feigned ignorance (“But 
you know it is true now”).  He also intuits the reason for her ignorance: that if she speaks the 
truth, it brings into reality that which she otherwise wants to ignore (“when you say it, even 
to yourself, you know it is true”).  These observations help explain his anger over Dewey 
Dell’s self-deception: if her motivations are obvious to Darl (and later in the text his 
assumptions are proven correct) her unwillingness to acknowledge them cannot be due to a 
lack of self-awareness.  Rather, as Darl implies, her self-awareness is what causes her to 
feign a lack of it.  The unwillingness to divulge her thoughts seems a highly disadvantageous 
choice given her unenviable situation: a young, pregnant and unwed woman with no formal 
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education, Dewey Dell would otherwise seem to be a person for whom family provides the 
only source of mental and physical sanctuary.  Instead, she resorts to secrecy, using her 
mother’s burial as an opportunity to abort her own child.   
 Symbolically her plight has a tragic quality, which should not be understated; but in 
the context of the novel, her interaction with Darl is but one example of the disconnect that 
exists among family members.  As the above interaction indicates, the communication 
ruptures in As I Lay Dying are necessarily presented through complex syntactic passages, and 
quite often from Darl’s hyper-aware perspective.  His perspective is not singular in the 
Faulkner canon, but he is representative of Faulkner’s “contemplative style, which draws 
readers into the process of thought and evaluation” (Bunselmeyer 425).  In the above 
passage, Darl’s evaluation of Dewey Dell is simultaneously fixated on what she is—that is, 
what he knows she is—and her reluctance to express what she is.  As should now be 
apparent, though Darl provides readers with the only constant narrative voice in the text, for 
his own part he is “haunted by ontology and abstract verbalization” (Delville 63).   The 
futility of his ruminations is underscored by the fact that in this particular situation, his 
obsession over a  question of being is really a question of appearance, and answering it 
provides no solutions.  In other words, Darl has no intention of helping Dewey Dell, he's 
simply fixated on whether she is embarking on the journey for the “correct” reasons—and 
ultimately he offers no assistance or reassurance, but instead redirects his consternation to 
another family member who causes him even greater feelings of alienation: his half-brother 
Jewel. 
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 As someone conceived outside of the family, Jewel literally represents the family’s 
essential dysfunction: though his status as a half-brother is unknown to most of the Bundrens, 
it exerts an indelible and negative force on the family as a whole.  His significant actions in 
the text highlight his emotional distance from the rest of the family, but also provide a 
semblance of motivation for that intentional distancing.  One indicative example is the story 
of how he procures a horse.  Darl recalls that a few years prior, Jewel had been skipping his 
chores on the Bundren farm and disappearing from his bed early in the morning.  This went 
on for several months until the family discovered he had been helping neighbors with their 
own farms to earn sufficient money to purchase a horse.  The chapter containing this story is 
structured around the speculations of Darl and Cash, and they assume that Jewel is having an 
affair with an older woman, which they believe is the only plausible explanation for his 
secrecy.  As the family gathers early one morning to tentatively prod Jewel for the truth, Darl 
writes that, “It was as though, so long as the deceit ran along quiet and monotonous, all of us 
let ourselves be deceived, abetting it unawares or maybe through cowardice, since all people 
are cowards and naturally prefer any kind of treachery because it has a bland outside” (323-
4).  From Darl’s perspective, which as noted earlier becomes Faulkner’s dominant objective 
voice, it’s clear the family had already intuited or deduced Jewel’s ongoing dishonesty but 
refused to acknowledge it and instead feigned a calm ignorance.  More troubling for Darl is 
the nature of their silence, to which he affixes a cynical platitude.  The rationale behind his 
condemnation of humans as cowards is paradoxical: we know, as Faulkner’s multiple-
perspectives reveal, that Darl's family is likely one that would rather pretend to be ignorant 
than to publicly confront an unpleasant reality.  We also know, given Faulkner’s frequently 
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isolated characters, that Darl’s experience is narrow, and that any proclamation about humans 
as a whole is undoubtedly informed almost entirely by his family.  We also learn that Jewel’s 
reluctance to tell his family was well-founded: Anse reacts with anger over the fact Jewel 
stole potential food from his family, and Addie quietly weeps later that night for reasons 
unexplained, with Darl as the sole witness.  Faulkner makes it clear that the Bundrens are a 
family of cowards in many ways, yet their respective “unknowing” states make them less 
cowardly than Darl, if we are use his own standards.   
 Darl’s cowardice is nearly spelled out in his resentment of Jewel, present at the 
beginning of the novel but rendered with increasing intensity as the story progresses.  The 
first chapter of As I Lay Dying begins with Darl observing Jewel not simply being, but 
acting: “Jewel and I come up from the field, following the path in single file.  Although I am 
fifteen feet ahead of him, anyone watching us from the cottonhouse can see Jewel’s frayed 
and broken straw hat a full head above my own” (255).  In addition to indicating Jewel’s 
height advantage, Darl’s first observation in the novel is primarily from the hypothetical 
perspective of another third-party observer.  Granted, only a third person can accurately 
gauge the heights of two different persons, but Darl’s preoccupation with how a person sees 
him continues throughout the text; this concern presupposes a heightened sense of self-
awareness, which Darl certainly possesses.   
 It seems logical then, as one critic points out, that Darl’s “antagonism toward Jewel 
is at least partly a result of jealousy for Jewel’s unquestioning, unconscious presence” (Simon 
105).  It is possible that Jewel’s self-consciousness exists and Darl simply doesn’t recognize 
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it, which would serve a novelistic purpose.  Even that wouldn’t diminish but would, instead, 
reinforce the absurd elements of Darl’s identity and the text as a whole.  Darl’s essential 
dilemma is that his sense of self is self-reflexive, but it is constantly subject to the whims of 
others who refuse or are unable to grant him access to their own subjectivities.  His lack of 
relation to others also relates back to Darl’s underlying ontological dilemma, which in turn is 
related to the existential dilemma that creates an absurd world-view: Darl simply cannot 
determine what is or what is not, and having access to another person’s thoughts is perhaps 
the only means for him to gain a circumspective view of the world—or even just of his own 
family.  He has little to gain from Jewel other than camaraderie and has received no 
indication that Jewel reciprocates such a need, yet in one of the novel’s most bizarre 
moments he suddenly confronts his half-brother in a way that is, for him, remarkably direct: 
“’Jewel,’ I say, ‘whose son are you?’” (368).  Jewel’s response is, “Goddamn you, goddamn 
you,” which reverberates throughout Darl’s mind for the rest of the novel.  From his 
perspective, a rare moment of candor is met with the kind of hostility reserved for an enemy.  
While typical of Jewel’s personality, his reaction is a microcosm of the Bundrens’ breakdown 
as they approach the journey’s end.  Only a few pages later, Darl burns down the barn 
temporarily housing Addie’s coffin in a desperate attempt to stop the trek; Cash’s leg, broken 
earlier and then cemented in lieu of a cast, has begun to rot yet he will not deign to ask for 
assistance; Dewey Dell seeks out a pharmacist to perform an abortion but is essentially 
manipulated into rape; Anse sells Jewel’s horse, seeks out a new wife unbeknownst to the rest 
of the family, and finally gets his false teeth.  Vardaman, like Darl, seems perplexed and 
overwhelmed with the circumstances, feelings which are compounded when the family 
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decides, rather suddenly, that Darl’s mental state is irreparably damaged and he must be 
committed.  As critics have argued, the destructiveness of these events subverts the typical 
novelistic progress toward growth and enlightenment.  Whereas, according to Frye, the 
“quest romance is the victory of fertility over the wasteland,” Kerr writes that As I Lay Dying 
“represents the victory of death and sterility and infidelity” (Frye 193, Kerr 13).  Kerr’s 
description is correct: there are no affirmations in the text and, as far as we can tell, no 
personal growth is derived from the adventure.  But a word must be said about As I Lay 
Dying’s comic value, which exists despite the darkness of the text, and is rendered in a way 
which, like many other themes in the text, runs parallel to Camus’ absurd.  
 Camus once wrote that what humans learn, they learn “not from circumstance but 
only from the contact of their natures with circumstance” (Kennedy 125).  This is in fact 
requisite to an absurd understanding of the world: the confrontation of one’s nature and 
rationale with the world itself.  Similarly, for Faulkner, comedic value rarely resides solely in 
occurrences, but rather how those involved cause or react to occurrences.  In an excellent 
essay examining Faulkner’s syntactic style, J.E. Bunselmeyer asserts that, “The comic 
occasion in Faulkner’s novels is often an occasion when action is taken without 
contemplation.  In the contemplative passages, characters realize that no goal is ever 
achieved; in the comic passages, characters act without thinking of ultimate futilities” (438-
9).  This concise summation of Faulkner’s technique applies especially well to As I Lay 
Dying, as its cast of characters—almost without exception—fit into one of these two 
categories.  Darl’s contemplative nature tends to dominate the text, but the other family 
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members serve as comic fodder in that they rarely consider, outside their own interests, the 
potential outcomes of their respective actions; they don’t consider what’s happening to be a 
struggle at all.  Conversely, if we view the characters from another, practical perspective, a 
legitimate interpretation of the text is that other family members (Jewel, for example) are 
able to act, while Darl is simply ineffectual.   
 Camus has something to say on this matter, as he is concerned with how persons 
incorporate the absurd into their actions and thoughts.  At this stage, having followed the 
progression and partial destruction of the Bundrens, it is also prudent to ask the question: is 
an absurd outlook necessarily nihilistic or destructive?  Camus’ answer to that question is 
complex, but summarized well by Leon Seltzer:  
 It is necessary to keep in mind that for Camus the absurd man is the most admirable 
member of his species: he alone has the courage to liberate himself from the 
illusions which illogically subjugate most…It cannot be overemphasized that the 
absurd man is called so by Camus not because he is less reasonable than most men 
but because he is far more so.  He is distinguished by a lucid intellection, which has 
in fact enabled him to understand his existence as absurd in the first place. (Seltzer 
15) 
Seltzer’s summary of Camus is in the service of an interpretation of Melville, but his 
statement can be easily applied to As I Lay Dying.  Regardless of what judgment we assign to 
the Bundrens individually, the entire family embodies the absurd, but none ever reaches the 
desired stage of liberation.  The family members and their various inclinations toward self-
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deception are absurd, but as individuals they do not reach Camus’ almost sublime state of the 
absurd outlook—for most of the Bundrens, we see an excessive degree of looking only 
inward, understood largely through Darl, who’s “lucid intellection” has already been 
discussed.  These characters are certainly comic, and scholars have felt comfortable laughing 
at them: both their actions and lack of forethought dictate such a response.  They're beyond 
the hope of being rescued from themselves, yet they “survive quite contentedly in the 
world…because they are simply unaware of the futility of their own conventions” (Schroeder 
42). 
  Darl's situation is more complex, however, for although he is involved in 
potentially comic situations, he often describes them with a sense of subdued horror and 
astonishment.  He is saved from strictly comic readings because of his fate.  His outlook on 
the world and his family becomes nihilistic in the novel’s last few chapters, and though he is 
distinct from family, he too is incapable of experiencing the strange affirmation of absurdity.  
Camus asserts that, “A man who has become conscious of the absurd is forever bound to 
it…But it is just as natural that he should strive to escape the universe of which he is the 
creator” (31-32).  Darl’s consciousness of the absurd leads to no metaphorical escape, but 
literal imprisonment: after he attempts to destroy Addie’s coffin, which was situated in a 
neighbor’s barn, the rest of the family must either pay for the destroyed property or send Darl 
away to an asylum.  Cash momentarily reflects on the situation, and sympathizes with Darl: 
“It’s like there was a fellow in every man that’s done a-past the sanity or the insanity, that 
watches the sane and the insane doings of that man with the same horror and astonishment” 
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(384).  Unfortunately for Darl, Cash’s nuanced view of psychology and insanity is 
outweighed by the reality of the situation as perceived by others, which leaves the Bundrens 
with no bargaining power: he attempted to destroy property, rendering all the motivations he 
had for doing so irrelevant.   
 Despite Cash’s misgivings about Darl’s imprisonment, he attempts a meager 
consolation:  “’It’ll be better for you,’ I said. ‘Down there it’ll be quiet, with none of the 
bothering and such.  It’ll be better for you, Darl’” (384).  The phrase “bothering and such” is 
in and of itself an almost absurd understatement: is Cash referring solely to the Bundrens'  
circumstances?  Or does he on some level understand Darl’s anguish, and believe that it can 
never be alleviated if he remains in the family’s company?  The reader can’t know, but Darl’s 
eerie response casts doubt on the validity of the latter hypothesis:  “’Better,’ he said.  He 
began to laugh again. ‘Better,’ he said.  He couldn’t hardly say it for laughing.  He sat on the 
ground and us watching him, laughing and laughing.  It was bad.  It was bad so.  I be durn if I 
could see something to laugh at” (384).  What his family sees as the potential for solace is for 
Darl a curse; what for his family is the most practical way to solve an economic problem, is 
for Darl the culmination of a series of events with no proper explanation or rationale.  More 
than ever, he is bound to his thoughts with, as far as the reader knows, no hope of resolving 
them.  Thus his response to this final misfortune is complete dissociation: after being sent 
away, his perspective oddly shifts, and in his final lines refers to himself in the third person:  
“Darl is our brother, our brother Darl.  Our brother Darl in a cage in Jackson where, his 
grimed hands lying light in the quiet interstices, looking out he foams.  ‘Yes yes yes yes yes 
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yes yes yes’” (393).  By referring to himself as what he is to the rest of the family, a brother, 
he completes the process of becoming an outsider and stranger even to himself.  Through 
forced separation, he becomes a family member to himself out of necessity. 
 Cash, in spite of his final ambivalence toward Darl's fate, is the only family 
member who attempts to understand Darl's position, and one of his lines resonates with the 
absurdity of the Bundrens and their situation: “It’s like it ain’t so much what a fellow does, 
but it’s the way the majority of folks is looking at him when he does it” (380).  Cash's 
fleeting observation points to the Bundren conflict between privacy and public life, depicted 
in their relations both to one another and to others in society.  Critics Baldanzi and Schlabach 
have written that as Addie’s body slowly decays, “The family’s private work of mourning 
quickly becomes a collective crisis for the communities through which it travels” (38-9).  
This doesn’t seem to get to the heart of the issue, however: though property is destroyed and 
a decaying body is wheeled through townships, Baldanzi and Schlabach contend that Addie 
Bundren’s body is a metaphor for those things kept secret by a society which chooses not to 
discuss them.  However, on several occasions neighbors and townspeople offer help to the 
Bundrens, but the family, led by Anse, will not let it become a true crisis of community.  
Even Darl, with his desire for meaningful communion with another human being, fails to 
incorporate anyone outside the family into his life.  When the family interacts with one of 
their neighbors, Vernon Tull, the results are unsatisfactory.  Tull describes his interaction with 
Darl with a mixture of discomfort and alienation: “[Darl] is looking at me.  He don’t say 
nothing; just looks at me with them queer eyes of his that makes folk talk.  I always say it 
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ain’t never been what he done so much or said or anything so much as he how he looks at 
you.”  Because of this disconnection, the Bundrens' isolation from outsiders begins to 
resemble their isolation from one another.  This is the true crisis of the novel, one created by 
the Bundrens, and over the course of the novel their losses are immense because of it.  By the 
time Addie is finally buried, it is impossible to ignore “the frightful circles of aloneness [and] 
the secret selfish dreams that forever cut each man from the other and that render what 
appears to be the faithful homage to the dead body of a beloved kin an empty ritual” 
(Wasiolek 388).  With the understanding that the Bundrens are emotionally cut off from the 
others, it’s appropriate that the most well-intentioned family member is not present to witness 
the end of a sham burial.   
  After these events have come to pass, a final absurdity awaits the reader, figured by 
Kerr as the perverted culmination of the family quest.  After disappearing for the night, Anse 
returns with a surprise for the remaining Bundrens.  After discovering that their father has 
finally purchased his new teeth (which only Addie’s death made possible), they bear witness 
to another absurdity.  Cash narrates the final sentences: 
 [The teeth] made him look a foot taller, kind of holding his head up, hangdog and 
proud too, and then we see her behind him, carrying the other grip—a kind of duck-
shaped woman all dressed up…And there we sat watching them, with Dewey Dell’s 
and Vardaman’s mouth half open and half-et bananas in their hands…I would think 
what a shame Darl couldn’t be to enjoy [the graphophone] too.  But it is better so 
for him.  This world is not his world; this life his life. 
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 ’It’s Cash and Jewel and Vardman and Dewey Dell,’ pa says, kind of hangdog and 
proud too, with his teeth and all, even if wouldn’t look at us. ‘Meet Mrs. Bundren,’ 
he says. (396). 
The Bundrens likely consider Darl’s imprisonment the nadir of their journey, but to an 
outsider this unexpected event is the final step which renders the burial journey utterly 
absurd.  Even Anse, the most incorrigibly self-centered family member, displays a flicker of 
self-awareness by being unable to look at this family, presumably out of shame or 
embarrassment.  Still, he gets a new wife and his teeth.  His is the text’s only triumph, and it 
“belongs to selfishness and insensitivity” (Wasiolek 392), as the family stands around in  
silence, pondering the future joy of listening to their new graphophone while one of their 
own foams at the mouth in his prison.  Though Cash is the narrator for the final chapter, his 
final observation is Darl’s hypothetical reaction to the journey: Cash correctly assumes that 
Darl would be unable to reconcile the intent of the journey with its outcome, in which his 
recently buried mother is summarily replaced by a new, strange woman.  Cash’s declaration 
that “This world is not his world” calls to mind another tragic character that will be discussed 
in the following chapter: Quentin Compson.  As is the case with Quentin, Darl “allowed 
awareness to defeat and debilitate... [his] problem remains his inability to bear absurdity”  
(Broughton 176).  The final question is whether Darl created that absurdity out of nothing, or 
if he simply responded to an absurd situation in the way that any rational person would have 
done.  Camus would likely contend that the answer is both: Darl’s divorce from his life and 
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from his setting is not unique but the logical result of reason confronting illogical 
circumstances, itself an unwinnable fight made more insurmountable by the singular  
obtuseness of Faulkner’s “witch’s brew.”        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
Chapter Three: 
 
Absurd Americans: The Compsons’ Nihilistic Descent 
 
 If one concurs with Camus and his existential conclusion, the image of Sisyphus in 
perpetual and interminable toil should be interpreted as a symbol of perseverance in the midst 
of futility.  Comprehending the underlying absurdity of his mission does not preclude the 
formation of existential meaning, but is in fact requisite for such a formulation.  In As I Lay 
Dying, Faulkner’s primary narrator is all too aware of the absurdity of his mission, but is 
unable to formulate something meaningful out of that fact.  Like the Bundren quest, the 
fundamentally arbitrary nature of Sisyphus’ unending task is responsible for bringing despair, 
which, Camus implies, is existential nihilism in its most pure form: if there is no apparent 
reason for a given occurrence, how then can a person consciously ascribe meaning to it?  
There are both religious and secular responses to such a question: Kierkegaard posits 
Christianity as the solution, while Camus’ answer is something akin to stoicism.  In this 
thesis, however, the solution is less relevant than is finding these notions of the absurd in 
Faulkner.  Indeed, those characters in Faulkner’s early works that can be most closely 
associated with the absurd are generally unable to find observable solutions to their states, a 
lack of will to which they react in various ways. 
 As a character who appears in two of Faulkner’s most well-regarded novels and 
expresses psychological turmoil in both, Quentin Compson is well-suited for interpretation in 
this context.  One of the underlying assumptions of this thesis is that literary interpretations 
of the absurd must not examine a character as a static entity, but as a culmination of thoughts 
and experiences; the path itself is what constitutes an absurd conception of the world.  This 
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assertion implies that the absurd is a reactionary state, one constructed solely out of 
responses to experiences.  To appreciate how this reaction is represented in Faulkner’s text 
then requires, at least in part, an examination of the process as conveyed through structure.  
That being said, the structuring of Quentin Compson is complicated because chronologically 
Absalom, Absalom! occurs before The Sound and the Fury, though the latter was published 
seven years earlier (1936 and 1929, respectively).  Multiple characters will be discussed later 
in this section, but any interpretations of Quentin will be based on a combined reading of his 
character as presented in these two texts.  Cleanth Brooks’s disclaimer in his 1963 study of 
the Compson family is representative of critical thought on this matter, and later critics have 
followed his lead.  He states: “[W]e must exercise caution in using the Quentin of the later 
novel to throw light upon the Quentin of the earlier.  But Faulkner, in choosing the character 
Quentin for service in Absalom, Absalom! must have deemed the choice a sound one.  He 
must have felt that the experience that Quentin was to undergo…would be compatible with, 
and relevant to, what he had Quentin undergo in The Sound and the Fury” (336).  That 
relevant experience is largely related to the basic question of what it means to “know”: 
Absalom, Absalom! takes up this question in a nearly academic fashion, perhaps because its 
primary characters are both college students.  The text is an exhaustive excavation of history 
which begins dispassionately and ends in confusion and personal turmoil.  It will be 
discussed first, in order to create a context for understanding the three narrators in The Sound 
and the Fury—though Quentin will remain the primary focus in that portion of the chapter, 
his brothers Benjy and Jason can each be interpreted in the context of the absurd that 
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Absalom, Absalom! helps create: one that like As I Lay Dying is rooted in family, but also 
incorporates extensive societal and generational degradation.  
 More than the other texts discussed here, Absalom, Absalom! is also a novel about 
the difficulty of reconciling one’s American identity with an absurd worldview.  Camus’ 
definition of the absurd makes allowances for social referent, as a person’s concept of home 
and place is tied to social belonging.  In Faulkner’s novel, the reader witnesses Quentin’s 
gradual disillusionment with history and his own sense of belonging, which carries over 
(chronologically) into The Sound and the Fury.  That text has distinct narrators, but as 
numerous critics have observed, each, “challenges the premise that one vantage point can 
ever claim to tell the ‘true’ story of a human experience” (Burton 610).  The human 
experience related in The Sound and the Fury is largely the disintegration of a once-proud 
family.  Though they contribute greatly to their own undoing, they too suffer through a 
collective crisis of identity, which provides another link between the two texts: through both 
the personal and the historical-political, Faulkner depicts people severed from connections 
that otherwise provide a stable worldview, which constitutes the world of the absurd as 
articulated by Camus.   
 Absalom, Absalom! focuses on the reconstruction of history, largely through the 
perspectives of Quentin and his roommate (and northerner) Shreve McCannon.  The reader 
comes to understand that the impetus for Quentin’s preoccupation with the recent history the 
south can be attributed to a series of conversations with Rosa Coldfield, a local spinster, and 
Jason Compson, Quentin’s father.  Each relates to Quentin stories about Thomas Sutpen, a 
legendary and infamous planter in Faulkner’s fictional Yoknapatawpha County.  Stories about 
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Sutpen are always filtered through the perspectives of the storyteller, but a few facts do 
emerge which will facilitate an understanding of the themes in  Absalom, Absalom! as they 
relate to this thesis.  
 The facts of Thomas Sutpen’s youth and upbringing create an image of the 
archetypal American success story.  He was born to a poor family in what eventually became 
West Virginia.  His family later moved to a region of Virginia where Sutpen first observed 
what may be understood as social and class stratification of the mid-19th century.  Quentin 
imagines that prior to relocating Sutpen could have never “imagined… a land divided neatly 
up and actually owned by men who did nothing but ride over it on fine horses or sit in fine 
clothes on the galleries of big houses while other people worked for them; he did not even 
imagine then that there was any such way to live or to want to live” (179).  Even these details 
are more intuited by Quentin than discovered, but that fact should not diminish the 
significance of his intuition, for his descriptions of Sutpen’s slow realizations serve several 
functions.  First, they position Sutpen’s growing awareness of America in strictly material 
terms.  There’s no mention of the innate constitutions of the people observed, but rather how 
they constitute themselves in relation to that which they can accumulate.  One of the simple 
absurdities Quentin points out is the dynamic between ownership and self-identity, even 
among those who own little.  He asserts that Sutpen, again, could never imagine “all the 
objects to be wanted which there were, or that the ones who owned the objects not only could 
look down on the ones that didn’t, but could be supported in the downlooking not only by the 
others who owned objects too but by the very ones that were looked down on that didn’t own 
objects and knew they never would” (179).  Quentin’s formulation of the situation certainly 
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has a quasi-Marxist foundation, but he avoids positing alternatives or making quick moral 
judgments on what he believes to be true.  This is in keeping with Quentin’s original reason 
for reconstructing Sutpen’s story, which is to understand the man and his motivations in the 
context of Southern history.  As Quentin says, Sutpen’s “trouble was innocence” (178).  His 
lack of experience with (then) modern American agrarian society made his discoveries even 
more disorienting, for they called into question assumptions he, in his innocence, held about 
how individuals arrange their lives.  In this new place he discovered: 
…country all divided and fixed with a people living on it all divided and fixed and 
neat because of what color their skins happened to be and what they happened to 
own, and where a certain few men not only had the power of life and death and 
barter and sale over others, they had living human men to perform the endless 
repetitive personal offices…that all have had to do for themselves since time began 
and would have to do until they died (180).  
This interpretation of American society alludes to an emerging class-based ownership 
system, and one which uses slavery to propagate its affluence.  Quentin reimagines the young 
Sutpen’s response not as disgust, but as bewilderment which over time evolves into ruthless 
ambition.  Here we see the juxtaposition of the relative, Sutpen’s interpretation of America, 
with the absolute—the circumstances which inform that interpretation.  Sutpen, at least 
according to Quentin, does not assign moral value to what he observes, but can only compare 
it to what he has felt and experienced in his own life.  Before living in Virginia, Sutpen had 
“thought that some people were spawned in one place and some in another, some spawned 
rich…and some not, and that… the men themselves had little to do with the choosing” (180).  
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This reveals a sort of fatalism not uncommon in Faulkner’s characters, but Sutpen is distinct 
in Faulkner’s canon because he comes to believe deeply in the popular notion of the 
American dream.  Quentin’s belief that Sutpen “had hardly heard of such a world until he fell 
into it” refers to a world where one can fashion out of nothing a satisfactory material 
existence, no matter one’s background (180).  Sutpen’s new outlook on life is, as far as 
anyone in the text can gather, an exercise in using any means to achieve a specific end.  From 
that point on, Sutpen is concerned with gaining both land and material wealth.  The 
reconstruction of his history is complex, but the important points are as follows: he moves to 
Jefferson, Mississippi and with the help of slaves and an architect, creates a mansion out of 
nothing.  He later marries the daughter of a plantation owner in Haiti, but discovers she is of 
mixed race, leaves her, and eventually—in a completely improbable event—Sutpen's son 
from a second marriage kills his interracial son from the first.  Sutpen himself is later killed 
by Wash Jones, a squatter on Sutpen's property, after having another child with Wash's fifteen 
year-old granddaughter.  Sutpen's final goal of having a male heir is never realized, and his 
once-proud mansion and estate slowly crumbles.    
 While undoubtedly a Southerner by virtue of his location, Sutpen and his way of 
thinking has been interpreted as distinctly Northern, notably by Cleanth Brooks in his study 
of Yoknapatawpha County.  In it, Brooks writes that Sutpen is: “a ‘planner’ who works by 
blueprint and on a schedule.  He is rational and scientific, not traditional, not religious, not 
even superstitious” (306).  Brooks goes one step further toward dissociating Sutpen from 
Faulkner’s typical Southern characters by asserting that Sutpen more closely resembles Flem 
Snopes than he does the Compson families: “Like Flem, [Sutpen] is a new man with no 
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concern for the past and has a boundless energy with which to carry out his aggressive plans” 
(307).  Brooks’ contrast is based on critically popular conceptions of the Compson's, who in 
various ways rely on the South as a historical-political relic for their identities and even well-
being.  By comparison, Sutpen and Snopes attempt to create new spaces for themselves using 
sheer force of will; they just, according to Brooks, happen to do so in the South.  Brooks 
constructs a binary for the purpose of excluding Sutpen from it and thus strengthening his 
argument, but even if Sutpen is uniquely Southern, his drives resonate across artificial 
geographic borders.  The motivation that comes to define Sutpen may be understood as one 
form of expansion that has significant and timeless power toward defining the American 
experience and American identity.  Absalom, Absalom! complicates the meaning one can 
form from this shared history by attacking it at its core: Thomas Sutpen is essentially a 
frontiersman, and the space he carves out of nothing is what Quentin comes to understand as 
the foundation of his family's place in the world, and by extension, his own.  Furthermore, 
the circumstances that surround Sutpen's rise to community prominence, as well as his 
subsequent destruction, are part of an American history whose cultural value even in the 20th 
century was open to interpretation.  Indeed, it’s the very question taken up by Quentin and 
Shreve, and the question Quentin feels he must answer in order to form a stable identity: is 
there a positive meaning behind the history he can unearth, or does this relevant part of 
American history simply constitute a meaningless series of events, which would in turn 
render his own life meaningless?  To help answer that question, a brief digression is 
necessary into the ways people other than Quentin have attempted to make sense of this 
historical dynamic. 
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 Even as the literal frontier of America faded and was replaced by civilization, the 
abstract notion of the frontier remained a popular symbol in American culture.  Its symbolic 
power is evident in any number of ways, from the ongoing success of films dealing with the 
subject, to the incorporation of its rhetoric in political speech and theater (and of course, texts 
like Absalom, Absalom!).  The concept appears to be enduring, and its application has been 
deemed appropriate in a variety of contexts.  For example, Richard Slotkin discusses John F. 
Kennedy’s 1960 acceptance speech at the Democratic National convention in the 
introduction to his extensive study of the American frontier myth, Gunfighter Nation.  In the 
speech, Kennedy “asked the audience to see him as a new kind of frontiersman confronting a 
different sort of wilderness” (Slotkin 2).  Kennedy attempted to create parallels between the 
actual frontiersmen, who “gave up their safety, their comfort and sometimes their lives to 
build a new world,” and those who “stand on the edge of a new frontier…of unknown 
opportunities and paths, a frontier of unfulfilled hopes and threats” (2).  Thus, though the 
physical space of the frontier no long exists in the 1960s, the “latent ideological power” of 
the frontier as a concept remained potent even then, and even for a man whose politics were 
identified with the eastern seaboard (2).  The sort of frontier invoked by Kennedy contains 
not only nostalgia for a past filled with adventurous heroes, but also the ability to organize 
the collective thoughts of a people around a central goal.  Politically speaking, though, the 
more contemporary notions of the frontier may be cynically regarded as a chimera, or a myth 
in a pejorative sense.  The word conveys vague notions of movement, progress, and 
expansion for the better of citizens at large, but if the symbol of the frontier as motivation for 
progress was codified around a static group of principles, political and social conflicts could 
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be easily remedied.  As it is, both conservatives and liberals have conceptions of what the 
frontier entails, and myriad responses to how it should be explored. 
 Slotkin alludes to the polyvalent nature of historical re-interpretation in his 
discussion of the sudden emergence of the American Western in the late 1930s.  In the midst 
of fascist and totalitarian takeovers in Europe and controversies over domestic New Deal 
policies, the Western as popular culture emerged as a means of conveying a “countervailing 
perspective that would deliberately focus on the positive elements of our history” (Slotkin 
280).  Slotkin traces the origins of this project to Howard Mumford Jones’ 1938 Atlantic 
Monthly article titled “Patriotism—But How?”  In order to fashion a positive narrative about 
American history—and to foster a positive patriotism to counter dangerous nationalism 
abroad—Jones wanted writers to seek out “thrilling anecdotes” and “glamorous” episodes of 
American heroism and history (280).  One may infer that Jones found a trade-off necessary, 
and that ensuring a positive image of American identity was worth subsuming the ugly 
portions of our history.   
 Unfortunately the project was doomed from the start, as Slotkins points out: 
throughout the ‘30s modernist writers had been reimagining our history in a much different 
context than the one posited by Jones.  Absalom, Absalom! was published in 1936, and along 
with other eminent works of the decade,  powerfully represents an image of America largely 
free of nostalgia and glamorous episodes.  The thrilling anecdotes in these texts never 
valorize a positive American half-history, but re-imagines the frontier as a place of 
intellectual and even spiritual uncertainty.  Slotkin writes that Absalom, Absalom! 
“inaugurated [Faulkner’s] ‘myth of the South’ by rooting the fabled plantation culture in a 
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legend of wilderness conquest” (280).  Slotkin is accurate in observing the aspects of 
wilderness conquest in Absalom, Absalom! but that portion of the text is limited to Sutpen’s 
history, which is of course constructed by a modern Southerner and Canadian  The conquest 
plot forms a substructure in a text otherwise concerned not just with the myth of the South, 
but with how our relativistic perspectives on history shape subjectivities—in ways which 
come to represent absurd conceptions of the world.  Quentin tries to account for his own 
confusion by arguing that, as a Southerner, only he can understand what has occurred.  He 
tells Shreve: “Gettysburg…you can’t understand it.  You would have to be born there” (289).  
Shreve then asks if Quentin actually understands it, to which Quentin replies “I don’t 
know…of course I understand it…I don’t know” (289).  His uncertainty indicates an 
essential difference between Shreve and Quentin: neither of them can rationally make sense 
out of what has occurred, but Shreve doesn’t feel the need to do so; he is satisfied, it appears, 
with being in a sort of communion with Quentin simply by sorting through the past.  Quentin, 
conversely, feels compelled to make sense out of it by constructing a satisfying and logical 
narrative.  This deepens his feelings of hopelessness, for rather than beginning and ending 
with his family, Quentin's despair now begins to extend to the past; history has undermined 
him, and he has fallen into its pit.  
 As Absalom, Absalom! draws to a close, the divorce between Quentin and the world 
around him becomes more pronounced.  This is not true of Shreve: the distance from the 
subject allows him a clearer insight, as he is able to speak of the events of the past in a 
concise way that escapes Quentin.  When Shreve attempts to conceive of Quentin’s home and 
the effects of the civil war and slavery, he phrases his accurate observations in the form of 
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question: “What is it?  Something you live and breathe in like air? A kind of vacuum filled 
with wraithlike and indomitable anger and pride and glory at and in happenings that occurred 
and ceased fifty years ago?” (289).  Shreve cannot feel what Quentin feels, but he can 
surmise that coming from such a place must simultaneously place burdens on a person's past 
and future, and that Quentin's hopes are determined by failures which have nothing to do 
with him.  Shreve wonders if Quentin will always feel that “as long as your children’s 
children produce children you won’t be anything but a descendant of a long line of colonels 
killed in Pickett’s charge at Manassas?” (289).  As The Sound and the Fury reveals, Quentin 
would never have the chance to find out, but even by the close of Absalom, Absalom!, when 
he manically reiterates that he doesn't hate the South, his fate seems already determined.   
 The reconstruction of history undertaken by both students, but more solemnly by 
Quentin, can be read as a response to the American ideal through the eyes of a young man 
coming from a defeated Southern family.  We learn in The Sound and the Fury that Quentin’s 
family has disintegrated, and it is likely that Quentin’s earlier attempt to re-interpret Sutpen’s 
past is a response to the familial and societal decay experienced in his young life.  The 
influence of his father, Jason Compson, cannot be understated—as with Darl's relationship 
with the rest of his family in As I Lay Dying.  Quentin and his father represent two different 
ways of viewing one's place in the world, and as in As I Lay Dying, the effect the father has 
on his son is immense.  Though Jason provides some of the spark for Quentin's excavation of 
history, he has managed to consign the past to nihilistic oblivion; it appears that his 
investment in its reconstruction begins and ends with Quentin, as his own identity is 
remarkably self-contained.  Conversely, Quentin is not satisfied with the patterns of his own 
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conjecture, but seeks to make sense of that which informs his life.  For Southerners and 
Americans as a whole, as scholars like Slotkin have argued, turning to the past and applying 
its lessons has been an integral part of how Americans formulate an identity.  Reliance on the 
past is inevitable when one's individual history has been shaped by larger political 
circumstances, which is certainly true of Quentin and the Compsons.   There are inescapable 
parallels between Sutpen's mysterious rise to and fall from prosperity and the South in 
general, so it should come as little surprise that Quentin conflates them with the hope that 
“solving” the Sutpen mystery will solve his own crisis of identity.   
 Writing about the 20th century South as represented by Faulkner, one critic asserts 
that, “Under the spur of the Civil War defeat, the Southerner’s need to believe in the 
aristocracy of his ancestors and in the superiority of his tradition hastened the spread of the 
Southern legend” (Backman 598).  In this light, Quentin's conflict is deepened, as he can no 
longer believe in the aristocracy of his family.  While history is the focus of Absalom, 
Absalom!, the Compson's family's dysfunction is described in The Sound and the Fury in a 
way that leaves no pretense for their supposed superiority: their fortune has diminished; the 
parents are distant (either due to alcoholism or neurotic behavior); the children encounter 
their own obstacles which result in the banishment of Caddy, the family's only daughter; and 
of course Quentin eventually commits suicide.  Perhaps worst of all is that by the close of the 
novel, the most powerful and capable Compson family member is Jason Compson IV, 
Quentin's younger brother, who also happens to be incorrigibly greedy, nihilistic, racist and 
sexist.  Given the facts of the Compson family, one can sympathize with Quentin's need to 
41 
 
 
believe in, at the very least, the Southern tradition and its legends.  Both he and his family are 
people without a future, and they reside in an inescapably unpleasant present.    
 In Camus’ absurd world, however, this state of living makes the Compsons typical, 
rather than an exception: they’ve simply been forced to confront problems of identity and 
belonging on both personal and societal levels.  Again, Camus, like most existentialists, takes 
as a given that “This world in itself is not reasonable,” but goes a step further to assert that, 
“what is absurd is the confrontation of this irrationality and the wild longing for clarity 
whose call echoes in the human heart” (21).  Thus being aware of the absurd, for a person 
with no “blinders,” as Camus calls it, is inevitable (55).  What matters for Camus is not 
simply the belief that the world is irrational.  That conviction can be held by the most 
religious and least religious persons, the most joyful and most hate-filled persons.  But what 
determines whether an individual can transcend the absurd or descend into nihilism is how 
they respond to it.  He incorporates the theory of permanent revolution into his ideal 
response.  That system seeks to achieve political circumspection through constant awareness 
and amendments, and for Camus this notion can be “carried into individual experience.  
Living is keeping the absurd alive.  Keeping it alive is, above all, contemplating it…the 
absurd dies only when we turn away from it.  One of the only coherent philosophical 
positions is thus revolt.  It is a constant confrontation between man and his own obscurity” 
(54).  A person can fail to confront the absurd in any number of ways: in As I Lay Dying, 
family members are typically too concerned about their own well-being, something they are 
able to decontextualize from the absurd.  Granted, their collective mission is absurd 
regardless, but only Darl is ready to acknowledge and confront that fact.  Cash attempts to 
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understand his brother’s viewpoint, but in the end feels that concordance with local 
ownership mores is a more desirable path than revolt.  If Absalom, Absalom! is mostly 
concerned with elaborating on the process of reaching the absurd, the The Sound and the 
Fury could serve as a guidebook for ways in which people can fail to sustain it—and 
therefore fail to overcome it. 
 As with As I Lay Dying, the meaning of the The Sound and the Fury is conveyed by 
the text’s form as much its content; or rather, the content creates the necessity for such a 
form.  In both texts, Faulkner depicts isolated events refracted through multiple 
consciousnesses, and, in The Sound and the Fury, through different temporalities.  Absalom, 
Absalom! creates a historical background through which to consider the Compsons and their 
collective fates, and in The Sound and the Fury, we see the individual fates of family 
members carried out.  And, again we see characters acting out of desperation and self-
ignorance, wallowing in their various states with little hope of overcoming them.  The novel 
is in turn told from a variety of perspectives: Benjy, the mentally handicapped fourth 
Compson child; Quentin; and Jason Compson IV, the third Compson child.  The novel’s 
fourth section is told from the third-person perspective.  The text’s individual sections 
contain their own stories but also feature overlapping segments of the Compson family 
history.  Together, a clear picture of their past emerges, but the meaning behind it is unclear, 
as each family member is in some way disconnected from the others and lives in a state of 
“isolation nearly unmitigated by communion” (Kartiganer 619).  Benjy has the most 
irreconcilable issue, and his thoughts consist of barely-linked memories which are recalled 
whenever an object prompts him to remember.  Quentin is highly neurotic and still dealing 
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with the crises of identity experienced in Absalom, Absalom!, and Jason IV simply hates 
everyone.  Faulkner is able to sustain this sense of isolation even in the third-person portion 
of the book.  Though Faulkner's fourth narrator is seemingly omniscient, rather than highly 
subjective, critics have still been unable to find a basis for textual unity in the concluding 
quarter of the novel.  One of the first published reviews of the novel alludes to this, with the 
writer commenting that, “one's only criticism [is] that the author gives no clue [concerning] 
what he is attempting to describe” but the text nonetheless “compels attention” (Patmore 
114).  This disunity is not due to a lack of design, but rather how each character is 
constituted: the very pattern of their lives and thoughts precludes any shared unity.  And if 
the characters cannot be unified, it follows that the larger text will suffer the same fate.  Even 
the novel’s titular reference to Macbeth bears relevance to its major characters and connects 
them to the themes of the absurd.  Shakespeare’s famous lines read:  “Life's but a walking 
shadow, a poor player \ That struts and frets his hour upon the stage \ And then is heard no 
more: it is a tale \ Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, \ Signifying nothing” (V.v.24-8).  
Shakespeare's words evoke a futile struggle with no meaningful outcome, and for the most 
part, The Sound and the Fury fulfills that description.  At least two of its main characters strut 
and fret their way to nowhere in particular, and the narrator of the first section, Benjy, fits the 
anachronistic label of an “idiot.” 
 That first section, told from Benjy’s perspective, is exceedingly difficult to navigate 
but thematically straightforward, at least in the context of the absurd.  Much of his section 
can be characterized as rote observation punctuated with related flashbacks to typically 
unpleasant events.  His two modes of thinking overlap and intertwine to the extent that 
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without italicized text, separating the two would be nearly impossible.  What distinguishes 
Benjy from the typical conscious human being is that his memory “does not really influence 
perception, and in fact he does not seem aware of the difference between them” (Kartiganer 
621).  His memory is not part of the process which informs the comprehension of present 
existence but is instead intermittent recollections of pure experience; in other words, he does 
not intentionally conjure memories that have a meaningful link to his present experiences.  
Instead, hearing a single word can send Benjy into the past: for example, overhearing a golfer 
utter the word “caddie” leads to a reverie about his sister Caddy, who we learn was his most 
caring family member prior to leaving.  Many of the memories expressed by Benjy revolve 
around Caddy and her complications with the family, but they are always divested of both 
time and genuine reflection.  The reader knows Benjy values the memory of Caddy, but only 
because he expresses his memories as they occurred, not because he expounds on their 
relevance to his present mindset.  Benjy remembers Caddy because a coincidental word or 
situation in the present shares a quality with her, whether it is a sight, color, or smell.  In one 
instance, when walking outside with his reluctant guardian Luster, Benjy describes his 
present-moment observations in a straightforward way, before being reminded of Caddy: “I 
went along the fence, to the gate, where the girls passed with their booksatchels. 'You, Benjy.' 
Luster said. 'Come back here.'” (47).  Benjy then instantly recalls a similar memory related to 
Caddy, this time in the presence of another guardian, which Faulkner indicates with italics: 
“You can't do no good looking through the gate, T.P. said. Miss Caddy done gone long ways 
away.  Done get married and left you.  You can't do no good, holding to the gate and crying.  
She can't hear you” (47).  In addition to being Faulkner's primary method of conveying the 
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Compson family history in this section of the novel, Benjy's  interconnected memories 
indicate that Caddy represents something both emotionally powerful and unaffected by the 
passage of time; this despite the fact that the conjuring of his memories appears instinctual 
rather than intentional. 
 A possible explanation for Benjy's seemingly automatic responses is the fact that he 
possesses an extreme objectivity far surpassing what the normal human mind is capable of 
achieving.  He can only recall specific situations rather than imagine them in the context of 
the present.  What Faulkner implies in the Benjy section “is that truth cannot emerge without 
the imaginative venture, without that active engagement of the mind with reality that 
somehow brings what we recognize as truth into being” (Kartiganer 624).  Nothing is 
brought into being for Benjy, not even his own self.  It isn’t until the fourth section of the 
novel that we fully comprehend Benjy’s isolation, when he is described by the outside 
narrator: “Then Ben wailed again, hopeless and prolonged.  It was nothing.  Just sound.  It 
might have been all time and injustice and sorrow become vocal for an instant by a 
conjunction of planets” (213).  It's obvious when we see Benjy from the outside that nothing 
he can “will” signifies anything, just as his memories signify nothing other than their own 
existence and surface similarities to present situations.  Of course, one would be remiss to 
neglect mentioning that for Benjy this is not a choice, and he is a more sympathetic figure 
than a pitiful one: he has always been divorced from his life and surroundings, and always 
will be.  He has no capacity for self-deception, and thus cannot, to use Camus’ terms, shy 
away from philosophical revolt. 
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Aside from being a technical marvel, Benjy’s section serves another significant 
function to the overall text by creating a counterpoint to the subsequent Quentin and Jason IV 
sections.  Benjy represents pure intuition and observation, while both Quentin and Jason IV 
represent subjectivity taken to dangerous levels: each, like Benjy, clings to remnants of the 
past, but both Quentin and Jason make the choice to do so, and both suffer for that choice.  
Not that the two brothers are entirely similar: as Marco Abel points out, each represents one 
part of the quote from Macbeth mentioned earlier: Quentin is the fool who lighted to death, 
while Jason is the actor, a comedian, who “tries to deceive his surroundings but only ends up 
deceiving himself” and finally disappears into those surroundings never to be heard (48).  
Keeping with the chronology of the novel, Quentin will be discussed in this context, followed 
by Jason IV. 
 If we consider Absalom, Absalom! the thematic precursor to The Sound and the 
Fury, then we know Quentin has already dabbled in the absurd and laid the groundwork for 
deep nihilism before the latter novel begins.  Nonetheless, the opening page of Quentin’s 
section sets an even more mean-spirited nihilistic tone that endures throughout.  He recalls 
receiving a watch from Jason, his father, which has been in the family for multiple 
generations.  Upon presenting the gift, Jason told Quentin, “I give you the mausoleum of all 
hope and desire; it’s rather excruciatingly-apt that you will use it to gain the reducto 
absurdum of all human experience” (64).  Jason paradoxically hopes the watch will help 
Quentin forget about time and not attempt to conquer it, for from Jason’s perspective, “no 
battle is ever won…They are not even fought.  The field only reveals to man his own folly 
and despair, and victory is an illusion of philosophers and fools” (64).  Jason’s language is 
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rich with references to concepts that resonate with Quentin, although one hopes the father did 
not intend to set his son on the path to suicide.  By referring to the watch as a “mausoleum,” 
Jason draws a comparison between an inanimate family heirloom and the Compson’s 
unfortunate past: by passing on an item that he received from his own father, who 
precipitated the family’s decline, Jason effectively passes on the family’s burdens to Quentin, 
who is woefully unprepared to handle them.   
 Jason's second quotation regarding the “battle” is arguably metaphorical, but it can 
also be read as an allusion to the civil war.  The war itself is not discussed in depth in either 
The Sound and the Fury or Absalom, Absalom!, but the latter text does contain references to 
the build-up.  For Jason Compson, who as far as the reader knows spends most of his time 
drinking whiskey on his porch, the war really was not fought, as even he lives only in its 
aftermath.  What he does know, however, is the field of war; that is, who constituted each 
side, and why and where the war was fought.  But as a southern man living out his remaining 
days in isolation, the facts of the war, which once inspired citizens from the north and the 
south to kill, can only provide insight into folly and despair.  And this is nothing new: it’s 
essentially a confirmation of what Quentin learned throughout Absalom, Absalom!  The 
young man is already at a point where he sees little positive value in his society’s larger 
history, and the effects of that disillusion are great.  At this point, shortly before his suicide, 
Quentin embodies the notion that “when a cultural myth can no longer be believed, the 
resulting loss of structure and of any points of reference brings man to a confrontation with 
nothingness” (Foster 99).  The only structuring device Quentin possesses is his father’s 
watch, and even that is handed over with a disclaimer espousing its uselessness.   
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 His growing belief in the meaningless of time along with his perpetually unhealthy 
relationships make Quentin a character on the precipice of intellectual and spiritual death: 
“He has no bond to humankind, and this lack of community in life is a symbol for his lacking 
the will to power—that is… the will to live” (Abel 47).  Indeed, in his section of the novel 
Quentin is apparitional, methodically and stoically preparing for suicide while dwelling on 
the memories and voices to which only he has access.  When he is forced to interact with 
strangers, he seems slight and unassertive.  At one point he is mistaken for a kidnapper, and 
after being told that he may be charged with criminal assault, reacts in a way that recalls 
Darl’s final breakdown in As I Lay Dying: “’Oh,’ I said.  Then I began to laugh...I tried to 
stop the laughter but I couldn’t” (109).  One of Quentin’s accosters voices what the reader 
may have inferred throughout section II and warns his friend, “’Watch him, Anse, he’s crazy, 
I believe” (109).  Then, from Quentin’s perspective: “the laughter ran out.  But my throat 
wouldn’t quit trying to laugh, like retching after your stomach is empty” (109).  Whether his 
actions are sheer insanity is unknown, but here Quentin describes his body as autonomous 
from his brain, as though it is reacting to something which his intellect cannot (or has not 
yet).  Darl’s laughter signaled the end of his rational mind, and the same could be true of 
Quentin.  Camus writes that, “We get into the habit of living before acquiring the habit of 
thinking.  In that race which daily hastens us toward death, the body maintains its irreparable 
lead” (8).  Bodily senescence is indisputable and not open for interpretation, whereas the 
mind is fickle and always shifting.  At this point in the novel, Quentin temporarily loses 
control over his body as it tries to express what it feels, even before Quentin can express 
what his mind knows.    
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 As his chapter (and life) draws to a close, Quentin recalls a conversation with his 
father which Faulkner expresses with a torrent of non-punctuated and continuous exchanges 
separated only by “and i” or “and he.”  In this conversation, Jason seems to sense the above 
distinction between awareness and knowing.  Jason correctly assumes that his son is tortured 
by a memory, in this case that of his sister Caddy, and he realizes Quentin is considering 
suicide as a permanent solution to the problem.  Despite his otherwise harmful nihilism, 
Jason's summation of Quentin's thoughts is accurate, and strikes a similar note as Camus' 
thoughts on the suicide, which he views as the ultimate philosophical failing.  He tells 
Quentin: “you are not thinking of finitude you are contemplating an apotheosis in which a 
temporary state of mind will become symmetrical above the flesh and aware both of itself 
and of the flesh it will not quite discard you will not even be dead” (136).  The only response 
Quentin can muster is to repeat the word “temporary,” expressing disbelief that his misery 
could not last forever.  Juergensen writes that, with “time defined by his father as absurd… 
Quentin has arrived at the conviction that sound in time really does signify nothing and that 
silence, outside of time and death, is preferable to it” (Juergenson 120).  Here an important 
distinction must be made: Quentin has accepted the absurdity of time, according to 
Juergenson, but the consequence of that supposed acceptance is, according to Camus, not 
actually acceptance at all, because his ultimate decision is suicide.  In Camus’ words, Quentin 
has chosen to “settle” the absurd: “Suicide, like the leap [mentioned earlier in the As I Lay 
Dying chapter], is acceptance at its extreme…In its way, suicide settles the absurd.  It engulfs 
the absurd in the same death.  But I know that in order to keep alive, the absurd cannot be 
settled” (54).  Camus’ philosophy rings true with Quentin, for as soon as the young man 
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believes he has reached a conclusion about, in this case, the absurdity of time (as well as the 
previously established issues of home and place), his choice is the repudiation of life—and 
simultaneously, a rejection of the absurd, for the absurd can only exist in the consciousness 
of a willing individual as he or she interacts with the world; negating one necessarily negates 
the other.  In the context of the absurd, Quentin Compson is then perhaps Faulkner’s most 
tragic character, as he is the only one who outright rejects its very existence, along with his 
own.  
 There are clearly essential differences between Benjy and Quentin, but for each, as 
Kinney posits, “the external world is composed only of stimuli which awaken and confirm 
the foregone conclusions of their recollected pasts” (307).  Quentin is of course highly 
conscious of this, and at every opportunity relives the past whether or not his present 
situation warrants it.  Benjy simply reacts to stimuli with what he knows: his memories.  But 
there exists a third character crucial to this reading of The Sound and the Fury, and one who 
is perhaps the least capable of earning sympathy, yet also comes the closest to prevailing.  By 
the time his story is told, Jason IV is the head of the Compson household: the eldest Jason 
and Quentin are both dead, Mrs. Compson is bedridden and Caddy has long since 
disappeared, though her daughter, Quentin II, has returned to live in the Compson home.  
Most of his section consists of chasing after Quentin II when he suspects she has run off 
without permission, a mission he undertakes with a mixture of hatred and excitement that 
typifies Jason’s view of the Compson family: he feels burdened by the responsibilities 
conferred upon him by virtue of being the last surviving somewhat-competent male 
Compson, but being the head of the family simultaneously fulfills his instinct “to insult or 
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control weak or apparently weak persons” (Folks 41).  He acts always out of self-interest but 
fails to realize that he unwittingly re-enacts the past failings of his family, or worse, he 
directly contradicts his own ideals without realizing he’s doing so.  This points to the cause 
of Jason’s undoing: his lack of self-awareness concerning his own thinking, which places him 
closer to the Bundrens’ end of the absurd spectrum than to the side occupied by Quentin or 
Darl.     
 One of his many deceptive actions is hoarding money intended for Quentin II.  He 
goes so far to convince his mother that she’s burning every check received from Caddy, but 
Jason is simply depositing the actual check for himself.  At one point he is confronted by his 
accountant, who warns Jason to be more discrete about spending stolen funds.  Jason 
essentially tells him to mind his own business, and in his characteristic way, manages to 
rationalize a situation that an honest mind couldn’t rationalize: “I never said anything more.  
It doesn’t do any good.  I’ve found that when a man gets into a rut the best thing you can do 
is let him stay there…I’m glad I haven’t got the sort of conscience I’ve got to nurse like a 
sick puppy all the time” (171).  This statement is doubly ironic, as Jason is the one stuck in 
an intellectual rut and refuses to let anyone assist him.  At the same time, while he has little 
trouble denying that he possesses a conscience, his most prevalent complaint is that others 
fail to exercise theirs.  He excoriates “the Jews” for controlling and manipulating his money, 
even as he invests money intended to support his niece.  He resents having to take care of his 
family without being properly reimbursed, yet he subsists in a home and on finances earned 
by his father.  He resents his parents’ irresponsibility and lack of foresight, and then misses 
an investment opportunity while he is aimlessly chasing Quentin II. 
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 Critical commentary on Jason IV has often commented on the extreme degree to 
which he, rather than all of those around him, is actually stuck in a rut.  Rick Wallach has 
noted that by constantly deferring responsibility and attributing his shortcomings to the 
defeats of his family and the squalor of his town, “Jason represses his cognizance of the 
similarity between his own blunders and those of his ancestors, wishfully distinguishing 
himself from them, instead of trying to come to terms with the habits of thought and behavior 
that actually bind him to the same fate” (Wallach 81).  Setting aside his family history (which 
Jason despises), he also overlooks his similiarities to his brother Quentin.  Like Quentin, 
Jason ultimately centers his thoughts on “the grotesque absurdity of death” (Folks 41).  More 
importantly, though, Jason “is as self-centered as [Quentin and Benjy] are, caught up by his 
memory of the past and haunted by a sense of persistent personal loss” (Kinney 308).  The 
difference is that Quentin looks inward: he moves through public spaces rarely interacting 
with a human and acting passive when he does.  Jason, on the other hand, takes the decay of 
his family and the pain it has caused him and turns it on other people, creating the artifice of 
vitality that sustains him.  According to Camus, suicide is the ultimate failing as it constitutes 
a meaningless abnegation of life, but Jason's way of living is in its way a perverse abnegation 
as well—and he manages to affect everyone around him in completely negative ways.   
 Like the outward-looking Quentin of Absalom, Absalom!, Jason finds little solace in 
his family, or his home—in this case the town of  Jefferson.  His perception of his place in 
time is such that his family and town/society “both demand only that he contribute to 
situations established prior to his time” (Kinney 308).  Reactions to this state of mind are 
myriad, as Faulkner has already demonstrated, and Jason's is particularly futile.  He believes 
53 
 
 
it impossible for his ideals to flourish in his environment, but rather than turning inward to 
confront that fact, he unconsciously conflates his emotions with his finances: his primary 
concerns are “investments, projected income, hoarded savings, and Wall Street speculations” 
(308).  He cares about his family insofar as they affect his financial state.  The irony is that 
Jason is as pathetic an investor as he is family member, and he fails at each, perhaps because 
the market forces that he ostensibly believes in “operate beyond his ken or control [which in 
turn] models his subconscious, reflecting back to him his disassociated selves while 
exacerbating his self-destructiveness” (Wallach 80).  Jason's entire section can actually be 
read as the merging of his financial and familial incompetencies into one self-destructive 
event: his rage-filled chase after Quentin II distracts him from a fluctuating market, causing 
him to ignore a neighbor's advice and thus losing his investment in addition to not solving his 
family crisis.  By the end of his tale, it is apparent he will forever be resigned to this sort of 
behavior, for its structure is a microcosm of his life.  It begins and ends with his hatred of 
Quentin II, saying “once a bitch always a bitch,” another instance of unintentional irony as he 
projects his own static self-hood onto another person (196).  In another instance of 
unconscious insight, Jason uses a younger member of the family on which to place blame, 
which unwittingly replicates the generational decay that has put him into his situation, as his 
actions toward younger family members all but ensure the continued downfall of the 
Compsons. 
 But perhaps that is unavoidable for the Compsons; this is one of the unpleasant 
impressions one takes from The Sound and the Fury.  Quentin discovered his own doom 
through his father and the south's stories, Benjy through his own mental deficiencies, and, as 
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Wallach argues, we can interpret “Jason’s obsessive and blundering transpositions of 
emotional values into financial terms against the equally delusory sensibility of southern 
capitalist culture,” the facts of which are unavoidable (Wallach 79).  As critics have noted, 
these elements of the novel form a sense of endless repetition, and even the three sections 
discussed all begin and end similarly.  What's more is that the concluding and omniscient 
fourth section ends the novel on the same note, which is one of the most explicit aspects of 
the absurd in The Sound and the Fury: a physical journey has taken place, as it did As I Lay 
Dying, and the same sense of isolation from others and the impossibility of creating a 
meaningful life is conveyed.   After Luster, Benjy's driver, starts on a different path toward 
the graveyard on one of their customary visits, Benjy begins to bellow.  Luster gives Benjy a 
flower and amends his path, and the final sentence of the novel proper reads: “The broken 
flower drooped over Ben's fist and his eyes were empty and blue and serene again as cornice 
and facade flowed smoothly once more from left to right, post and tree, window and doorway 
and signboard each in its ordered place" (237).  In Benjy’s case, the placating “ordered place” 
signifies nothing but a return to a sense of normalcy, which, for a person of limited mental 
capacity, has no value outside of familiarity.  John V. Hagopian, in his study of The Sound 
and the Fury's fourth section, writes that “the false order that ironically soothes [Benjy] 
dramatically frames the entire novel in the same way that Mr. Compson's sophisticated 
commentary frames the Quentin section” (205).  Indeed, just as Jason's gift to his son related 
the absurdity of time, the final image of the temporarily pleased Benjy offers no meaningful 
solution to the problems—both existential and physical—encountered by characters who 
always live up to Faulkner’s famous title.   
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Chapter Four: 
Making Sense out of Absurdity 
 In the closing pages of The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus elucidates the connection 
between the absurd and hope, and acknowledges the apparent contradiction between the two: 
 It is strange in any case that works of [absurd] inspiration like those of Kafka, 
Kierkegaard, or Chestov—those, in short, of existential novelists and philosophers 
completely oriented toward the absurd and its consequences—should in the long 
run lead to [a] tremendous cry of hope.  They embrace the God that consumes them.  
It is through humility that hope enters in.  For the absurd of this existence assures 
them a little more of supernatural reality.  If the course of this life leads to God, 
there is an outcome after all.  And the perseverance, the insistence with which 
[absurd heroes] repeat their itineraries are a special warrant of the uplifting power 
of that certainty. (Camus 134-5). 
After discussing As I Lay Dying, The Sound and the Fury and Absalom, Absalom! in the 
context of an absurd framework, one may be struck with the notion that in these works 
Faulkner is hopelessly nihilistic, especially when compared to the ultimately affirmative 
absurd outlook offered by Camus and exemplified by the myth of Sisyphus: he perseveres for 
the sake of perseverance while Faulkner’s major characters—most of the Bundrens and most 
of the Compsons—toil not in the name of perseverance, but out of habit, spite or hatred.  We 
are witness to suicide, incest, madness and deception, rather than uplift.  Faulkner structures 
the novels around that very lack of hope: the pointless and falsely-motivated journey in As I 
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Lay Dying, the circular and recurring tragedy of The Sound and the Fury, and the 
impenetrability of a sordid past in Absalom, Absalom!.   
 The inability to find superficial affirmation in these works should not preclude 
artistic appreciation; it may even enhance the way we understand Faulkner.  To be certain, 
he’s not a singular writer for his obsession with alienation and despair, or for his fragmented 
narrative styles: others before him, from Joyce to Proust, Woolf to Conrad can be counted 
among those artists who experimented radically with form and who saw existence “as a 
presence of fragments often moving to no particular end or recognizable rationale” 
(Kartiganer 614).  But Faulkner, as does Camus in his philosophy, attempts to take that lack 
of direction and rationale and create out of it his own fragmented world with its own 
rationale.  It’s a world in which isolation grips the vulnerable, separating them from family 
and community; where a person's sense of self is occupied with what has occupied, and still 
occupies, others.  In short, it’s a world familiar to all yet strange and discomfiting when 
confronted artistically.  Yet his art is not simply mimetic.  Instead it forces all observers to 
fragment his or her own thoughts, to regard the text not as a narrative monologue but as a 
multiplicity of voices; and from those voices, construct a largely inferred meaning.   
 But, aside from those characteristics, what distinguishes Faulkner from others are 
his characters.  His fictions can be summed up as “the histories of characters whose very 
sanity seems to ride on the truth of their perspectives” (Kartiganer 618).  In the world 
Faulkner creates, his characters are at once familiar yet off-putting: the Bundrens are full of 
unsurprising human flaws, but variously take opportunities to care for one another while 
rejecting the help of any outsiders; they are the rugged individuals who fail at being rugged 
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and barely qualify as individuals.  The Compson family ceases looking to the future and 
decays slowly, yet continues to structure their world around the very ideas and value that 
brought about their failure.  To say the least, it becomes a difficult task to put a positive spin 
on these characters, which can make venturing into these texts a daunting if not depressing 
experience.  The lack of an intermediary or controlling voice shifts even more focus onto the 
flawed characters and the contradictions within their lives, complicating popular conceptions 
of the sort of role the modern author should play in his or her text.  Michel Foucault asserts in 
“What is an Author?” that the modern writer “serves to neutralize the contradictions that may 
emerge in a series of texts” and provides “a point where contradictions are resolved, where 
incompatible elements are at last tied together” (111, 119).  In Faulkner’s texts, 
contradictions are not resolved but collapse into nihilism and other ailments of the spirit.  His 
incompatible elements, at least in these works, tend to be family members who are tied 
together to the detriment of the parties involved.   
 Recent Faulkner criticism has found ways not to gloss over his often contemptible 
major characters, but to incorporate them into visionary readings regarding sexism and 
racism.  Scholarly work on Absalom, Absalom! has recently focused more on the edges of 
and spaces within the text.  The intricacies of conversation between dominant white male 
characters have been pushed to the side and instead the recurring othering of black or 
interracial characters has been examined.  Rather than being only another lens with which to 
view the text, these sorts of readings do their part to solve the problems within the novel 
itself.  Barbara Ladd’s essay “The Direction of the Howling,” discusses the underlying 
impact racism has on how Americans conceive of our society, which is Quentin Compson’s 
58 
 
 
main struggle.  She writes that Faulkner’s frequent use of the interracial black male in 
Absalom, Absalom! signifies this particular ‘other’s’ “capacity to delineate the political and 
cultural repressions and displacements, the submerged or forgotten history that underlies the 
dream of U.S. national unity” (Ladd 526).  Her essay allows us to see a character like 
Quentin Compson as only one person amidst a vast exchange of historical and political 
information.  While one should hesitate to attribute all of the text’s unanswered questions to 
the haunting remnants of slavery, its one example of how out of hopeless individual 
circumstances, a deeper understanding of ourselves emerges.   
  Finding affirmation in the face of despair is also possible by applying 
contemporary feminist thought to Faulkner.  Numerous essays have examined the presence of 
Caddy Compson in The Sound and the Fury: she is the only daughter in the Compson family, 
and none of the novel is told from her perspective, but, as feminist critics have argued, she 
has an immeasurable impact on the rest of the Compson family.  Because she is an archetypal 
“fallen woman,” the male characters consider themselves through her, though she is never 
able to speak.  The estrangement from her family is largely due to the fact that she became 
pregnant while unmarried: in another society, such an impediment could be overcome, but in 
the one Faulkner created, it leads to misery for everyone—except perhaps for Caddy, who 
escapes her family and leaves them to wallow in their self-imposed moral prison.  Caddie's 
situation in relation to the rest of her family has parallels to feminist readings of Addie 
Bundren in As I Lay Dying: allotted only one chapter, from the after-life no less, Addie’s 
cynical perspective on her own mothering provides an interesting counterpoint to every other 
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character in the novel who appears to be mourning her: the joke appears to be on them, as she 
expresses anger at what her life was forced to be, and to whom she was forced to yield.   
 The above examples are representative of contemporary readings of Faulkner's 
otherwise dour texts, but in the context of the absurd, perhaps no stronger counter-example 
exists than Dilsey, the matriarch of the Compsons' black servant family.  She is mostly 
relegated to The Sound and the Fury's fourth section, and otherwise appears as a subtle 
contrast to the ultimately fruitless ruminations of the Compson brothers.  She lives her 
present life in the material consequences of a past that can only affect Quentin intellectually, 
yet provides opposition to what Davis calls “the erosion of morals, values, and meaning” so 
prevalent throughout the text (109).  According to Davis, the church service Dilsey attends 
near the of the novel  provides a uniquely black “alternative vision” which undercuts the 
nihilism experienced by Faulkner's white male creations (109).  Faulkner’s focus on these 
men should not be taken as an endorsement of their views, for in Faulkner’s “extremely 
relativistic view, wherein God truly is an active for reality for those who believe in him and a 
mockingly hollow absence for those who do not, what is ludicrous and absurd to Quentin in 
his experience of life may be real and vital to Dilsey in hers” (Palumbo 144).  Even 
Faulkner’s later works show signs of breaking free from darkness and focusing more 
explicitly on people who are able to overcome their problems: fifteen years after its original 
publication he added a final chapter to The Sound and the Fury, which ends with the well-
known phrase, “They endured,” referring to the novel’s remaining characters.  Go Down, 
Moses was published in 1942, five years after Absalom, Absalom!, and takes up many of the 
same issues.  In this novel, rather than succumbing to a world which has no rationale, the 
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main character is able to abnegate those things which have confounded him, and continues 
on in spite of them.  He endures as well.  
 When Albert Camus wrote The Myth of Sisyphus, he was in part responding to 
philosophers who were committing, as he saw it, “philosophical suicide”—that is, 
philosophers who took up questions of existence and, rather than simply feeling awe and 
wonder at the nature of the question, transcribed their thoughts into, among other ills, 
extremist political thought or utter nihilism.  For Camus, many had hit the figurative wall and 
regressed, unable to find meaning in the ostensibly meaningless; for how can a person simply 
exist if he or she finds no value in existence?   
 In his previously discussed novels, Faulkner presents similar observations through 
his many failed characters.  This is not to say that he set out with the absurd in mind, or with 
a unique conception of the absurd; it’s a simple idea that has worked its way into our popular 
culture.  But for some people and situations absurdity turns into despair and tragedy.  That 
progression has been a literary convention for centuries, but Faulkner’s way of showing it 
anew is noteworthy.  He represented the state as it exists: in the self-aware mind, which must 
continuously grapple with it.  At the same time, in his hands, the difficult and overly abstruse 
problems of modern philosophy become familiar and relatable: the problems of how one 
belongs or doesn’t belong in a family or a country, and the effects of such ambiguity.  Many 
of his creations don’t survive, but their stories become our stories, and as ongoing Faulkner 
scholarship demonstrates, choosing to endure through them livens and lightens even the 
darkest corners of our minds and our pasts. 
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